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Global inequality is a relatively recent research topic. Th  e  ﬁ  rst calculations of inequality across world citizens 
were done in the early 1980s (Berry, Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1983; Grosh and Nafziger, 1986). Th  is  is 
because in order to calculate global inequality, one needs to have data on (within-country) national income 
distributions for most of the countries in the world, or at least for most of the populous and rich countries. 
But it is only from the early to mid-1980s that such data became available for China,2 Soviet Union and its 
constituent republics and large parts of Africa.
Before we move to an analysis of global inequality, however, it is useful to set the stage by delineating what 
topics we shall be concerned with and what not. Th   is is necessary, precisely because of the relative underde-
velopment of the topic, reﬂ  ected in the fact that the same or similar terms are often used in the literature to 
mean diﬀ  erent things. We need to distinguish between inequality among countries’ mean incomes (inter-
country inequality, or Concept 1 inequality, as dubbed by Milanovic, 2005), inequality among countries’ 
mean incomes weighted by the countries’ populations (Concept 2 inequality), and inequality between the 
world’s individuals (global, or Concept 3 inequality).
Concept 1 inequality deals with convergence and divergence among countries, and although this 
line of work was at ﬁ  rst couched in inequality terms (see Baumol, 1986), most of the later work used cross-
country regressions and β convergence.3 In such regressions, each country/year is one observation. Th  is  line 
of research, which has generated a huge literature, is interesting for a number of reasons, but it has very little 
to tell us about income inequality among world citizens. Th   is is basically because countries are of unequal 
population size. Th   us, a fast increase in the income of a poor small country will not have the same eﬀ  ect on 
global inequality as the same per capita increase in a poor and populous country.
Concept 2 inequality tries to take this into account by weighing each country by its population. It is 
a low-cost approach since it requires knowledge of only two variables: mean income, which is approximated 
by gross domestic income (GDI) per capita, and population size. Th  e  ﬁ  rst such calculations were done by 
Kuznets in 1954 (see Kuznets, 1965: 162ﬀ  ).4 Some thirteen years later, as part of their ﬁ  rst study of purchas-
ing power parity (PPP), Kravis, Heston and Summers (1978) calculated Concept 2 inequality for the non-
socialist world.
Th   ere are two reasons for the enduring popularity of this approach (for recent examples, see Schultz, 
1988; Boltho and Toniolo, 1999; Firebaugh, 2003). First, Concept 2 inequality is the largest component 
of global inequality. Global inequality is, by deﬁ  nition, composed of population-weighted international 
1 Th   e views expressed are personal and should not be attributed to the World Bank or its aﬃ   liated organizations.
2 Th  e  ﬁ  rst post-Cultural Revolution household survey in China was conducted in 1978. Th  e  ﬁ  rst available rural and 
urban surveys are from 1980 and 1981 respectively (see Ravallion and Chen, 2006: 3). 
3  Some of the initial emphasis on inequality, rather than on β coeﬃ   cients, can still be seen in the use of the sigma 
convergence where sigma is the standard deviation of income logs. 
4  For the year 1949, Kuznets calculated a Concept 2 inequality that covered around a third of the world’s population. 2  DESA Working Paper No. 26
inequality (Concept 2 or between-inequality), and inequality due to income diﬀ  erences within countries. 
Th   e relationship is shown in equations (1) and (2) for Gini and Th  eil  coeﬃ   cients respectively, where yi = per 
capita income of i-th country, pi = population share of i-th country in total world population, πi = share of 
i-th country in total global income, n = number of countries, Gi = Gini coeﬃ   cient of national income dis-
tribution, Ti = Th  eil  coeﬃ   cients of national income distribution, and L = the so-called overlapping compo-
nent.5 Since the ‘between’ component is by far the larger, accounting for between ⅔ and ¾ of global inequal-
ity (depending on what inequality measure one chooses), Concept 2 inequality can be used as a lower-bound 
proxy to global inequality. Moreover, its movements can be presumed to track changes in global inequality. 
Second, the data requirements for the calculation of Concept 2 inequality are modest.
           ( 1 )
Concept 2 Gini
           ( 2 )
Concept 2 Th  eil
Of course, what Concept 2 inequality does not take into account are within-country inequalities. In 
calculating Concept 2 inequality, we implicitly assume that each individual within a country has the same 
per capita income (and thus Gi=Ti=L=0). Th   is last assumption needs to be abandoned if we want to calcu-
late ‘true’ global inequality across individuals. But in order to abandon it, one must have access to national 
income distributions which are available only from household surveys. It is this ‘jump’ that makes such a big 
diﬀ  erence in data requirements between Concept 2 and Concept 3. From being ‘modest’, the data require-
ments now become huge, since, ideally, we should have access to national income distributions from all the 
countries in the world.
Th   is leads to a very important, albeit not suﬃ   ciently appreciated, diﬀ  erence between Concepts 2 and 
3. Th   is is not a conceptual diﬀ  erence, but rather the diﬀ  erence in what is a commonly used metric of welfare. 
To be sure, Concept 2 inequality can be calculated using either GDIs per capita or mean disposable incomes 
retrieved from countries’ household surveys (HS). It is however almost never calculated using the latter 
because HS means are much more diﬃ   cult to obtain than from national accounts (NA) data. In contrast, 
Concept 3 inequality must be based on household surveys because the only sources of distributional data are, 
as said before, household surveys. Because there is no world-wide household survey, this means that the best 
one can do is to combine individual countries’ surveys, and use disposable per capita income or personal per 
capita consumption as welfare indicators.
Now, the ﬁ  rst problem is that there is a deﬁ  nitional diﬀ  erence between GDI which comes from na-
tional accounts, and disposable income which comes from surveys. Second, there has been a recent tendency 
for these two measures not to move in unison in several important countries (see Deaton, 2005). Th   us, even if 
everything else were fully comparable, a commonly calculated Concept 2 measure that uses national accounts 
data will diﬀ  er from an equivalent Concept 2 measure calculated using household surveys because welfare 
5 Th   e overlapping component accounts for the fact that somebody who lives in a richer country may have an income 
lower than somebody from a poorer country (and the converse). L is calculated as a residual, and this is why the Gini 
index is, unlike the Th   eil index, not exactly decomposable.Global Income Inequality: What it is and Why it Matters?  3
indicators are diﬀ  erent and because they have recently diverged for reasons that are not yet quite clear.6
Th   is review will deal only with studies of global or Concept 3 income inequality.7 Th   e way to esti-
mate global inequality is to calculate Concept 2 inequality using nation accounts data, and to combine it 
with the empirical observation that within-country income distributions tend to follow a log-normal pat-
tern. Th   en, the only additional piece of information needed is a Gini coeﬃ   cient, or some other summary 
inequality statistic describing national income distributions. Th   ey are published in various compendia of 
Gini coeﬃ   cients such as the WIDER and Deininger-Squire databases, etc.
Under the assumption of a log normal distribution of income, the inequality statistics allow us to 
derive an estimate of the variance of each national distribution. Once we know the variance and the mean, 
and given the assumption of log-normality, we can estimate the entire distribution, that is, each fractile’s 
income. It is then a relatively simple task to combine these national distributions into a single world-wide 
income distribution, particularly so if one uses an exactly decomposable measure of inequality like the Th  eil 
coeﬃ   cient or the variance of logs. Th   is was precisely the approach followed by many early and some recent 
studies of global inequality (Berry, Bourguignon and Morrison, 1983; Grosh and Nafziger, 1986; Quah, 
1999; Shultze, 1998; Chotikapanich, Valenzuela and Rao, 1997). At times, this approach can be reﬁ  ned by 
using a bit more information than what is contained in a Gini or Th   eil index. Sala-i-Martin and Bhalla have 
used quintiles of income distribution to get a better handle of national distributions and thus a more precise 
estimate of global distribution. All these methods can be considered tatonnements, groping for the global 
distribution.
Th   ese methods are quite ingenious, given their rather minimal information requirements. But 
they are also very ‘costly’, because it is often the numerous assumptions, rather than the data, that drive the 
results. A lot of assumptions are made simultaneously (e.g. that each country’s distribution is log normal; 
that GDP per capita gives the correct mean income, and that its under or over-estimation, compared to 
household surveys, is constant across poor and rich alike), and it is nearly impossible to tell the impact of 
each separate assumption on the results. Further, since even the minimal data requirements (national Ginis) 
are not satisﬁ  ed annually, authors are led to make additional assumptions (for example, that national in-
equality does not change or changes in an assumed fashion), so that in the end, the part of the results driven 
by various assumptions may vastly outstrip the part based on actual data. Th   e best recent examples of such 
approaches, which are often thinly disguised Concept 2 inequality calculations, are Bhalla (2002) and Sala-i-
Martin (2002a; 2002b). In Bhalla’s (2002) calculations of global inequality, only one out of his 24 distribu-
tions is based on actual data, while 23 are ‘derived’ through assumptions; in Sala-i-Martin’s (2002a) paper, 
the ratio is one actual to four ‘derived’ distributions.8
6 Th   is area—understanding why national accounts and household survey averages move diﬀ  erently—represents one of 
the most important areas for further research. Bhalla (2002) must be credited through his, at times single-minded, 
insistence on using national accounts data for highlighting this issue.
7  And with global inequality conventionally deﬁ  ned as inequality in relative, not absolute, incomes, and using 
conventional measures of inequality like the Lorenz curve, Gini coeﬃ   cient or Th   eil index. Th   e focus on absolute 
inequality, however, has its own uses (see Atkinson and Brandolini, 2004; Svedberg, 2003; Ravallion, 2004). Similarly, 
relative income inequality, with the use of diﬀ  erent inequality aversion parameters (reﬂ  ecting, in principle, diﬀ  erent 
welfare judgments), will produce ambiguous results, even where conventional statistics yield a clear outcome (see 
Capeau and Decoster, 2004: Table 5).
8  For a critique, see Milanovic (2005: 119-127).4  DESA Working Paper No. 26
Compared to this method, the quantum leap is to directly use household surveys from as many 
countries as possible (ideally, all). Th   is was done by Milanovic (2002; 2005) and by the World Bank (2005). 
Here, in principle, global inequality is calculated the same way one calculates within-country inequality, 
using not national accounts data, but survey data. Another quantum leap in this line of research will occur 
when these, so far disparate, national surveys are standardized, or a single world-wide household survey is 
conducted. We shall come back to this in the third section. Now, we have to brieﬂ  y cover some methodo-
logical issues that are very important in this type of research although they seldom receive the attention they 
deserve.
Some methodological issues
We start with the simplest question of all: what is ‘income’ in calculations of global inequality? As we have 
seen, most of the early work used national accounts data, that is GDI per capita expressed in the same cur-
rency (international or PPP dollars). Th   is is because household survey data for many countries were simply 
unavailable (and even when they existed, researchers could not get them because the statistical agencies 
refused to release them).9 Th   ere are currently three main sources of world wide data on GDI per capita across 
time and across countries. Th   ey are World Bank data, available in World Bank World Development Indica-
tors (WDI), the Penn World Tables, and Angus Maddison’s data. Th   e advantage of using GDI per capita as 
‘income’ is that these numbers are relatively uncontroversial, even if the three sources do not always agree 
among themselves. We know what is meant by GDI per capita and we know that these values do give some 
generally accepted mean incomes of all nations.10
Th   e main drawback of this approach is that GDI per capita is not ‘income’ in any recognizable sense 
to any individual or household. Gross domestic income includes components such as corporate investment 
from retained proﬁ  ts, build-up of stocks, government spending on defence, etc., which are not part of even 
broadly deﬁ  ned household disposable income. In addition, publicly ﬁ  nanced health and education are part 
of GDI per capita, but not included in household per capita disposable income unless one is able to im-
pute—which is quasi impossible in a multi-country context—these values back to individual households 
based on survey data on school attendance and use of medical services.
Another drawback is that the combination of GDI per capita with some distributional statistics 
(to reﬂ  ect national income distribution) mixes two aggregates, calculated from diﬀ  erent sources, and this 
‘mixing’ is not distribution-neutral. On the one hand, we are using country GDI per capita, and on the 
other, we are applying to this mean, distributional parameters obtained from surveys of household dispos-
able income.11 It was already explained that the two instruments are diﬀ  erent by deﬁ  nition. But in addi-
9 Th   is is still the case with many countries that refuse to release micro data to any institution or individual. Such 
countries are quite diverse, ranging from Japan to Algeria. Th   ere is thus a paradoxical situation that a number of 
expensive instruments like household surveys exist in the world; yet, they cannot be used because of misplaced policies 
of some countries’ statistical oﬃ   ces. Th   e issue of conﬁ  dentiality, with which they sometimes defend their practice, is 
clearly bogus since no researcher can ever identify the participating households. Are we to believe that a researcher in 
2006 is going to identify the Japanese households that took part in a survey conducted in 1973? 
10  It has not always been like that. Consider the problems of converting Communist countries’ national accounts 
methodology to the national accounts statistics (NAS) system, and of course, the issue of the deliberate falsiﬁ  cation of 
national accounts. 
11 Th  e  diﬀ  erence in coverage and deﬁ  nition between national accounts and surveys means that, even if everything were 
perfectly measured, it would be incorrect to apply inequality or distributional measures—which are derived from 
surveys—which measure one thing, to means—which are derived from national accounts—which measure another 
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tion, such an adjustment is not distribution-neutral. We know that surveys tend to under-represent capital 
income or under-survey rich people (see Mistiaen and Ravallion, 2003).12 Th   us, a simple scaling-up of all 
survey incomes by a given parameter will reduce poverty below what it really is and underestimate inequal-
ity.13 When a diﬀ  erent mean (GDI per capita) is applied to a survey-based distribution, we implicitly allocate 
the diﬀ  erence between GDI per capita and disposable household per capita income across all households 
(more exactly, in proportion to reported household income). Poor people’s incomes are increased in the same 
proportion as rich people’s incomes. But if most of the diﬀ  erence between the two concepts is due to the 
unreported income of the rich, then this approach wrongly inﬂ  ates the incomes of the poor.
Now, the income of the rich, which accounts for the bulk of the diﬀ  erence between GDI and 
disposable income, is of two types: ﬁ  rst, the deﬁ  nitionally diﬀ  erent part, which consists of publicly-ﬁ  nanced 
health and education, corporate proﬁ  ts, etc., that are consumed by the rich, but also by the middle-classes 
and some poor in rich countries;14 second, the income of rich people in each individual country that is 
missed out by surveys (e.g. property incomes). All actual recipients of these incomes are globally-rich because 
the middle-class and even the poor from the rich world are in the top quintile of the global income distribu-
tion, but the diﬀ  erence between the two aggregates is spread much more widely: some of it is imputed to the 
poor in the poor countries which, we know, receive none of it.
Consider the following example. Let the poverty line $PPP1 per capita per day. Let the average per 
capita disposable income from surveys of several groups of the poor in India be $0.75, $0.8, $0.85. Now, 
suppose (very realistically) that India’s GDI is some 35 per cent higher than disposable income. We know 
that most of this 35 per cent is received by the rich, either because they beneﬁ  t more from publicly-funded 
public services, or because they fail to report their property incomes. What the authors (in particular, Sala-
i-Martin, 2002a; Bhalla, 2002) then do is to multiply the incomes of the poor by the factor of 1.35. Th  en, 
suddenly, none of them is poor any longer: they have all crossed the poverty threshold. Pure magic!15
But if we decide that ‘income’ in global studies should be the same concept as in national studies of 
inequality—that is per capita disposable household income—the problem is not solved yet. Th   is is because 
national deﬁ  nitions of survey income are very diﬀ  erent, and the more countries we include, the more diﬀ  er-
ent they become. A huge eﬀ  ort, conducted by the Luxembourg Income Study, has gone into standardization 
of national deﬁ  nitions. A similar project is underway at the World Bank using Living Standards Measure-
ment Surveys (LSMS). Yet, the standardization covers only a small portion of all countries and surveys.
12  Income from property is notoriously underestimated in household surveys (even leaving aside the fact that most 
surveys do not include capital gains at all). Concialdi (1997: 261) claims that the best available French household 
surveys underestimate capital incomes by about 40 per cent. Wagner and Grabka (1999) estimate German property 
income to be underestimated by almost one-half compared to national accounts data. In Japan, according to Ishizaki 
(1985), only 12 per cent of property income is ‘captured’ by household surveys (quoted in Bauer and Mason, 1992: 
407).
13  We speak of scaling-up, rather than scaling-down, because GDI per capita is normally greater than household per 
capita disposable income.
14  Disposable household income, retrieved from surveys in West European nations, amounts to about 60 per cent of 
GDI. A bulk of that diﬀ  erence is explained by health and education consumption. Publicly-ﬁ  nanced health and 
education as a share of GDI is much less in poor countries.
15  On the additional pitfalls caused by the use of averages from national accounts and distributions from household 
surveys, see Ravallion (2000), Deaton and Dreze (2002), and Deaton (2003). 6  DESA Working Paper No. 26
Th   e main diﬀ  erences arise in the treatment of self-employed income (what are business expenditures 
for the self-employed?), valuation of home-consumption, including owner-occupied housing,16 treatment 
of publicly-provided health and education beneﬁ  ts, and the use of top-coding of high incomes (where all 
incomes above a certain ceiling are coded as equal to that ceiling).17 For diﬀ  erent countries and at diﬀ  erent 
levels of development, diﬀ  erences in the treatment of these categories are not equally important. For poor 
countries, it is the problems of valuation of own consumption and self-employed income that are the most 
diﬃ   cult and that can make individual incomes often move up by a factor of 2 or more; for the rich coun-
tries, it is the treatment of publicly-provided health and education beneﬁ  ts that is of most concern. Swed-
ish disposable income with them or without them is quite diﬀ  erent. For countries with extravagantly rich 
individuals, it is the underestimation of capital incomes which is of concern.
But there is no agreement that ‘income’ in global inequality studies should be income at all. Many 
people think that rather than income, one should look at consumption or expenditures as the true indicator 
of the standard of living. Th   is debate mirrors the debates in individual countries since obviously inequality 
can be measured using either income or consumption. What lends this debate an added importance in the 
case of global inequality is that in many countries, household surveys ask questions about income only, while 
in other countries, they ask for both, or for expenditure only. Th   en, a global study of inequality has to do 
what all national studies try to avoid, that is to mix household survey data that use two diﬀ  erent concepts 
of ‘income’: disposable income and consumption. Th   is introduces an error whose direction and magnitude 
cannot be estimated.
Although in the last few years, there has been a trend toward the use of consumption measures (not 
the least through the eﬀ  orts of the World Bank and the inﬂ  uence it has exerted on the choice of survey in-
struments in the former communist countries and in Africa), we are still far from unanimity on this issue. In 
the study of global inequality based on 1998 benchmark data, Milanovic (2005: 104) used 63 consumption 
instruments and 59 income instruments. Th   is represents a signiﬁ  cant increase in the number of consumption 
instruments compared with ten years before (80 income-based and 22 consumption-based distributions), 
but for some of the most important countries (like China), one still depends on income data alone. If a guess 
had to be ventured, it could be said that there is likely to be a tendency toward greater use of household per 
capita consumption as the main welfare indicator. While quite defensible from a strictly methodological 
perspective, this will open up a number of issues of comparability since most historical income distribu-
tion statistics (e.g. in the United States, UK, France, Germany) are income-based. One thus needs to weigh 
methodological and quality improvements in snapshots of recent income distribution against the breaks in 
historically existing series.
Considering the problems of the appropriate welfare indicator, other methodological issues are easier 
to deal with. Whatever ‘income’ is, that ‘income’ should be expressed in per capita terms, and should be 
equal for the members of a household. Th   is means that the two issues often debated in national inequality 
studies are ‘solved’ here: the issue of equivalence scales, and intra-household inequality. Th   ey are ‘solved’ be-
cause at the current level of statistical development, there is simply no way to account for economies of scale 
and size across diﬀ  erent countries.
16  For example, in 1990, the Chinese statistical oﬃ   ce changed the valuation of grain output produced by rural households 
from state-mandated to market prices. Th   is generated a large change in calculated poverty rates and a break in the rural 
mean income series (see Ravallion and Chen, 2005). 
17  For example, the US Current Population Survey ‘top-codes’ all very high wage and capital incomes. Similarly, the 
maximum capital gain that can be recorded in the survey is $149,999 per household annually.Global Income Inequality: What it is and Why it Matters?  7
Th   e main reason for this is that economies of scale and size depend on the relative prices of public 
and private goods (if housing is very cheap, economies of size will be small) and they systematically diﬀ  er be-
tween poor and rich countries (see Lanjouw and others, 2004). Until we have a better handle of the relative 
prices of public and private goods,18 we cannot adjust internationally for equivalent units. Th   e use of a given 
equivalence scale for all countries in the world would be much more arbitrary than the use of per capita 
calculations. Similarly, we lack information about within-household inequalities.19
Another issue on which there is agreement is that whatever ‘income’ is, it needs to be adjusted us-
ing a country’s relative price level. In other words, we need to use PPP exchange rates to translate domestic 
currencies into international dollars. Ideally, of course, one would like to move toward a better adjustment 
where, at least for some large countries with less than fully integrated markets, PPP exchange rates would dif-
fer between diﬀ  erent parts of the country (e.g. the price level in the richest Chinese province is estimated to 
be 76 per cent higher than in the poorest; see Brandt and Holz, 2006).
Another concern is that the relative prices faced by diﬀ  erent parts of the income distribution are not 
the same. According to Pogge and Reddy (2002), relative food prices faced by the poor in poor countries 
are higher than implied by the use of a single all-consumption PPP.20 Food prices are what really matters for 
the poor, and the use of a lower overall price index will artiﬁ  cially boost poor people’s incomes in India and 
elsewhere in poor countries.21 Pogge and Reddy advocate a cross-country project akin to the one currently 
conducted by World Bank’s International Comparison Project which would generate PPPs relevant for the 
very modest, principally food, basket consumed by the poor across the world. But so long as within-country 
(e.g. provincial) PPPs and PPPs diﬀ  erentiated by income class are not available, we are obliged to use a single 
PPP exchange rate per country.
How about the use of market (rather than PPP) exchange rates in global inequality calculations? 
Th   is is a useful complement because it gives us a diﬀ  erent insight into inequalities. If one is interested in 
global purchasing power or ability to aﬀ  ect the world economy, then conversion of local incomes into actual 
US dollars makes sense. But there are relatively few instances where we are interested in this, and most of our 
interest in global inequality is really based on the desire to compare living standards of diﬀ  erent people. For 
that purpose, PPP exchange rates are, of course, better.
How great is global inequality?
Th   ere is general agreement about the size of global inequality, and there is general disagreement about the 
recent direction of change of global inequality. Table 1 shows the results for global inequality obtained by a 
18  And also relative prices of child vs. adult goods if we are to adjust for household composition, and not only for 
household size. 
19  Schultz (1998) however tries to account for intra-household inequality by using gender gaps in schooling (for each 
country) to estimate gender gaps in income at the household level. 
20 Th   is means that the ratio of food prices consumed by the poor in (say) India compared to the food prices of the same 
goods in the US is higher than the ratio between the overall price level in India and that in the US. 
21 Th   e reason behind such income overestimation is as follows. Th   e weights in the ‘world’ consumption basket of goods 
and services are decisively inﬂ  uenced by the prices and structure of consumption in rich countries since they are 
obviously the largest consumers. Th   en, a relatively high consumption of services in poor countries -- which are cheap 
there, but are assessed at much higher ‘world’ prices -- tends to show poor countries’ (and poor people’s) incomes to 
be higher than they ‘really’ are. One possible way to adjust for this is to move from the commonly used Geary-Khamis 
index, which has this property, to more ‘neutral’ price indices (Afriat or EKS) where the weight of rich countries is less 
(see Dowrick and Akmal, 2001).8  DESA Working Paper No. 26
number of authors using quite diﬀ  erent techniques: most of them mix national accounts information (using 
GDI per capita as mean income) and household survey information, and only a few use household surveys 
directly. In all the studies however, the recipients are individuals (inequality is expressed on a per capita 
basis), and national incomes are converted into international (PPP) dollars although the PPP exchange rates 
may be drawn from diﬀ  erent sources. All Gini values for the 1990s, with the exception of the two extremes 
(61 and 71), lie within a relatively narrow range between 63 and 66. Th   e similarity in the results is even 
more remarkable when one realizes that the standard errors of these estimates are between 2 and 3 Gini 
points,22 and that most of the estimates are consequently within one standard error of each other.
As for the direction of change—comparison between 1990s and 1980s—there is no unanimity. Sala-
i-Martin and Bhalla, using very similar methodologies, argue that global inequality has declined by between 
3 and 4 Gini points. Dikhanov and Ward as well as Bourguignon and Morrison ﬁ  nd an increase of about 1 
Gini point. Sutcliﬀ  e concludes that there was no change, and Milanovic ﬁ  nds an increase of 3 Gini points 
between 1988 and 1993, followed by a decline of 1 Gini point in the next ﬁ  ve years.23 His most recent (and 
unpublished) calculations for 2002 show another small increase of about 1 Gini point. Th   us, according to 
Milanovic, there are zigzags. Th   ey are explained by the slow growth of rural incomes in India and China 
as well as the economic collapse of Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, both of which contributed to global 
inequality. When both developments were reversed in the next ﬁ  ve-year period, global inequality decreased. 
But these are zigzags caused by speciﬁ  c economic events in large countries, not a trend.
Th   is lack of unanimity on changes, and disagreements on whether there is any trend at all, stem not 
only from the diﬀ  erences in methodology, but paradoxically, also from the very similar results that all authors 
obtain regarding the overall level of inequality. Th   e reason is as follows. Diﬀ  erent methodologies yield similar 
inequality levels, but they do so with quite a lot of noise caused by measurement problems. Mean incomes, 
whether obtained from surveys or national accounts, are not consistently calculated, and key data sources 
disagree among themselves. Th   e computation of Concept 2 inequality using GDI per capita—a metric on 
22  One has to be careful in the interpretation of the standard error. Th   e standard errors are obtained using simple 
‘bootstrapping’ techniques, so they basically show how sensitive the estimated Gini coeﬃ   cient is to any single 
observation (Milanovic, 2002). Th   ese results do not include any information about the reliability of the underlying 
national income distributions (viz, how correctly incomes are measured). 
23 Th  e  World  Bank’s  World Development Report, 2006 uses mean log deviation as the measure of global inequality. It ﬁ  nds 
that it has decreased between 1994 and 2000 from 0.87 to 0.82 (see World Bank, 2005: 64).
Table 1.
Global inequality (in Gini points) in the 1990s, according to various authors
Author Year Gini value National mean incomes from: National income distributions from:
Milanovic (2005) 1993 66 Household surveys Household surveys
Milanovic (2005) 1998 65 Household surveys Household surveys
Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) 1990s 66 GDI (Maddison) Household survey estimates
Sala-i-Martin (2002a) 1998 61 GDI (Penn World Tables) Ginis and quintiles from HS
Bhalla (2002)  2000 65 GDI (Penn World Tables and WDI) Ginis and quintiles from HS
Dikhanov and Ward (2001) 1999 68 National consumption (WDI) Ginis and quintiles from HS
Dowrick and Akmal (2001) 1993  71 GDI Ginis and quintiles from HS
Sutcliffe (2003) 2000 63 GDI (Maddison) Ginis and quintiles from HS
Chotikapanich, 
Valenzuela and Rao (1997) 1990 65 GDI (Penn World Tables) Ginis for HS
Key: HS: household survey; GDI: Gross Domestic Income; WDI: World Development Indicators (World Bank).Global Income Inequality: What it is and Why it Matters?  9
which there is apparently least dispute—from World Bank or Maddison’s data series will diﬀ  er by several 
Gini points. Th   is is because, as pointed out by Sutcliﬀ  e (2003), Maddison’s data include estimates for a 
number of worn-torn or otherwise ‘excluded’ countries like Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, the Congo, Cuba, 
North Korea, etc., that are almost invariably poor and not included in the World Bank database. In addition, 
Maddison’s growth rates for China are less than the oﬃ   cial rates and those used by the World Bank. It is then 
not surprising that when one superimposes estimates of national distributions on one or another set of GDIs 
per capita to generate global inequality, the choice of the GDI database will clearly inﬂ  uence the end result.24
Income distribution data, particularly when extrapolated from quintiles or from Gini coeﬃ   cients, 
are even noisier. Furthermore, due to the absence of income distribution data for many countries, some 
authors (e.g. Bhalla and Sala-i-Martin) resort to very dubious assumptions, e.g. that income distributions do 
not change over time or change in a certain (linear) fashion or everyone in a country has the same income. 
In most cases, this myriad of assumptions and measurement errors tend not to bias the results in one direc-
tion only, but probably to oﬀ  set each other, producing relatively similar levels of inequality. But when one 
re-estimates global inequality for another year, while the level hardly changes, the result is (on account of 
the measurement error, if nothing else) likely to be slightly diﬀ  erent. It is that slight diﬀ  erence that is then 
interpreted as the evidence of a change, or in some cases, even of a trend.
How big is a Gini of around 65? It is larger than the inequality found in any single country includ-
ing South Africa and Brazil, two of the most unequal countries in the world, whose Ginis are in the upper 
ﬁ  fties or low sixties. Th   e Gini coeﬃ   cient however does not give an intuitive feel for how large global inequal-
ities are. A better way to look at it is to consider how the overall pie is distributed among diﬀ  erent fractiles of 
the distribution. Th   us, for example, the top 5 per cent of individuals in the world receive about 1/3 of total 
world (PPP-valued) income, and the top 10 per cent get one-half. If we take the bottom 5 and 10 per cent, 
they receive 0.2 and 0.7 per cent of total world income respectively. Th   is means that the ratio between the 
average income received by the richest 5 per cent and the poorest 5 per cent of people in the world is 165 to 
1 (Milanovic, 2005). Th   e richest people earn in about 48 hours as much as the poorest people earn in a year.
Another important question is to ask how much of global inequality is due to diﬀ  erences in the 
mean incomes of countries and how much is due to income diﬀ  erences within countries. Some 70 per cent 
of global inequality is ‘explained’ by diﬀ  erences in countries’ mean incomes. Th   is is a sharp reversal from a 
situation which existed around the time of the Industrial Revolution when more than half of the (admittedly 
very rough) estimate of global inequality was due to income diﬀ  erences within nations (see Bourguignon 
and Morrisson, 2002).25 Th   en, in contrast to today, the diﬀ  erences between countries’ mean incomes were 
relatively small. For example, in 1870, the average (un-weighted) GDI per capita of the ten richest countries 
was 6 times greater than the average (un-weighted) GDI per capita of the ten poorest countries. In 2002, the 
ratio was 42 to 1.26
24  For example, Concept 2 inequality calculated using World Bank GDI per capita data from 138 countries shows a 
decrease of some 3 Gini points between 1985 and 2000. Th   e same concept calculated using Maddison’s data over the 
same period for about 160 countries shows a decline of only 1 Gini point (author’s unpublished calculations).
25 Th   is is an estimate based on the Th   eil decomposition between inequality due to the diﬀ  erences in incomes between 
six country groups, namely ‘Africa’, ‘Asia’, ‘Japan, Korea and Taiwan’, ‘Latin America’, ‘Eastern Europe’, and ‘Western 
Europe and its oﬀ  shoots’, and inequality within country groups. Since there are no data on income distributions for 
most countries in the world prior to 1950, Bourguignon and Morrison use estimates for a few select countries to 
‘impart’ the same distributions to other countries in the group. Th   eir between-component accounts for some 30 per 
cent of global inequality. Obviously, if they had data on all countries’ distributions, the between-component would 
have been larger. However, it is unlikely to have exceeded one-half of global inequality. 
26  Both calculated from Maddison (2004) data. 10  DESA Working Paper No. 26
While income inequality between countries is the largest component of global inequality, overlaps 
between countries’ distributions (that is, some people from a poor country being better oﬀ   than some people 
from a rich country) are not negligible either.27 We illustrate this in Figure 1, which plots the position of 
each 5 per cent (ventile) of diﬀ  erent countries’ distributions in the global distribution. Consider the line for 
France. We calculate the mean income (in international dollars) of each French ventile from the lowest (ﬁ  rst) 
to the highest—arrayed on the horizontal axis—and then ﬁ  nd their positions in the global income distribu-
tion. As can be seen, the poorest 5 per cent of Frenchmen have a mean income which places them in the 72nd 
percentile of the world income distribution; the richest 5 per cent have incomes which place them in the 
top percentile of the world. Hence, French income distributions span the range between the 72nd and 100th 
percentiles in the world. Consider now rural Indonesia at the bottom of the ﬁ  gure. Here, the range is from 
the 4th percentile to the 56th percentile in the world. Th   e two distributions (France and rural Indonesia) do 
not overlap at all.28 But this is not the case if we compare Brazil and France: more than a third of all Brazil-
ians are richer than the poorest 5 per cent of the French.29
Th  e  ﬁ  gure illustrates not only that inequality due to within-country distributions is still signiﬁ  cant, 
and that countries are not homogeneous entities composed of either rich and poor people only, but will have 
practical implications when we discuss global transfers (see the ﬁ  fth section). In short, if transfers were to 
ﬂ  ow from mean-income rich to mean-income poor countries, and we do not a priori know who their ben-
eﬁ  ciaries are, a glance at Figure 1 immediately convinces us of the need to take recipient countries’ income 
distributions seriously. Th   is is because of the probability that money raised from a French citizen will end 
27  Note that in a world of large between-country income diﬀ  erences, and very small within-country inequalities, there 
would be no overlap at all, and 100 per cent of global inequality would have been ‘caused’ by between-country 
diﬀ  erences.
28 Th   is is, of course, true at the level of ventiles. It is quite possible, even likely, that there are some individuals in rural 
Indonesia who are richer than some individuals in France. If we conducted the analysis in terms of national percentiles, 
rather than ventiles, there would be some overlap. But it would be clearly minimal. 
29  Even if at each given ventile, the income of the French is higher than the income of the Brazilians. Th  is 
means that French income distribution is ﬁ  rst-order dominant over the Brazilian distribution (as is, for 
example, the Sri Lankan over the rural Indonesian), even though the French and Brazilian distributions do 
overlap (unlike the French and the rural Indonesian).
Figure 1:
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up in the pockets of somebody who is richer than he, is higher if money is transferred from France to Brazil 
than if it is transferred from France to rural Indonesia. But we shall return to this topic below.
Is there a link between globalization and global inequality?
It is often implicitly assumed that the changes in global inequality can be interpreted as telling us whether 
globalization leads to widening or shrinking income diﬀ  erences among individuals in the world.30 However, 
the causal link between globalization and global inequality is very diﬃ   cult to make. To see this, consider 
several ways in which globalization aﬀ  ects inequality among individuals in the world. Th  e  ﬁ  rst channel goes 
through globalization’s eﬀ  ects on within-country distributions. As we would expect from economic theory, 
the eﬀ  ect varies between rich and poor countries. In the simplest Hecksher-Ohlin world, globalization would 
increase demand for, and the wages of, low-skilled labour in poor countries and the wages of high-skilled 
workers in the rich world. Consequently, we would expect income distribution in poor countries to become 
‘better’ and income distribution in rich countries to get ‘worse’.
Th   is is not, however, consistent with what has been observed over the last twenty years when distri-
butions in poor, middle-income and rich countries have tended to grow more unequal (Cornia and Kiiski, 
2001). Th   is is an issue which has recently been studied a lot and is still the subject of intense debate: Is 
openness to blame for increasing wage and income diﬀ  erences in the US? Is openness associated with rising 
income inequality in poor countries? For example, Milanovic (2005) and Ravallion (2001) ﬁ  nd that open-
ness is associated with increased inequality in poor countries, and lower inequality in rich countries, while 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) argue that there is no systematic eﬀ  ect of openness on inequality.31
Th   en, and this is the second channel, globalization may diﬀ  erently aﬀ  ect mean incomes in poor and 
rich countries: in other words, it might lead to divergence or convergence in country incomes. Th   ere is no 
unanimity on this point either. Most authors agree that openness is positively associated with mean income 
growth, but some of them (Sachs and Warner, 1997; World Bank, 2002) ﬁ  nd the eﬀ  ect stronger for poor 
countries, while others (DeLong and Dowrick, 2003; Dowrick and Golley, 2004) argue that the openness 
premium has been larger for rich than for poor countries during the last twenty years.32 Th  e  ﬁ  rst group of au-
thors would expect openness to lead to shrinking diﬀ  erences in national mean incomes. Th   erefore, they have 
to explain away the observed divergence in mean country incomes by the lack of openness among the lag-
gards. According to the second group of authors, the divergence is an indication that the eﬀ  ects of openness 
might change over time, and that openness, even if positive for all on balance, may exacerbate inter-country 
inequality.
Th   ird, the eﬀ  ects of globalization may vary between populous and small countries. Th   is area has not 
been much explored except in the context of the rather limited (in scope and number) studies of small island 
30 We  deﬁ  ne globalization in terms of an outcome variable: increased share of trade and direct foreign investments in 
GDI. Th   is is quite acceptable when we have income inequality as the left-hand side variable since inequality moves in 
response to outcomes (higher or lower trade). But one could also deﬁ  ne globalization in terms of policies (e.g. lower 
trade barriers).
31  For a review of the literature, see Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004). Th   e role of trade in increasing wage 
diﬀ  erentials in rich countries is the subject of a voluminous controversy (for some examples, see Freeman, 1995; 
Slaughter, 1999). 
32  According to them, the openness premium was larger for poor countries in the 1960-1980 period, but then changed 
in the last two decades. For some speculation on what might have triggered that change, see Dowrick and Golley 
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economies. Yet, one can imagine that globalization may play out diﬀ  erently in populous countries with large 
domestic markets, or in small niche economies like Hong Kong, Singapore or Luxembourg, than in middle-
size countries.
And ﬁ  nally, and possibly, most importantly, the eﬀ  ect of globalization on global inequality will de-
pend on history, that is on whether populous countries happen to be poor or rich at a given point in time. To 
see this, assume for a moment that globalization has a positive impact on the growth rates of populous and 
poor countries, and has no eﬀ  ect on within-country income distributions. Th   is will, in the current constel-
lation of world incomes (see Figure 2), mean that India and China would be expected to catch up with the 
rich world, while their national distributions will not change, and global inequality will tend to decrease.33 
Th   ere would be both mean-income convergence and reduction of global inequality. But let us decouple the 
poor and populous countries. Suppose that India and China are rich (and still populous) and let most poor 
countries be relatively small. Now, mean income convergence will continue, but the eﬀ  ect on global inequal-
ity will be ambiguous. China and India will beneﬁ  t from the pro-big bias of globalization, but since they 
would be rich, globalization will be less beneﬁ  cial to them than to poor countries. Th   ese two eﬀ  ects will 
pull in opposite directions, and global inequality may go down or up. Moreover, if populous countries are 
generally poor, the convergence eﬀ  ect is nil, globalization on average favours small countries and leads to the 
widening of national income distributions, then the overall eﬀ  ect must be to increase global inequality.
Th   is illustrates a key point: even if the eﬀ  ects of globalization on within-country inequality, mean 
income convergence, and populous vs. small countries, are unambiguous and do not change over time, 
globalization’s impact on global inequality will vary depending on where along the international income 
distribution, countries with diﬀ  erent attributes happen to lie at a given point in time. Th   e implication is, of 
course, that all statements about the relationship between globalization and global inequality are highly time-
speciﬁ  c, contingent on past income history, and not general.
33  We are concerned with eﬀ  ects at one point in time only. Independent changes in population may, by aﬀ  ecting the 
weights in the inequality statistics, inﬂ  uence changes in global inequality on their own. For example, China’s impact 
on global inequality can be decomposed between income per capita growth eﬀ  ects and population growth eﬀ  ects. Jiang 
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Does global inequality matter?
Th   ere are two views on this matter (as on pretty much everything else discussed here). One group of people 
believe that global inequality is irrelevant. Th   ere are two reasons why it may be so. According to Bhagwati 
(2004), even calculation of global inequality is ‘lunacy’ as it is a mere number. Th   ere is no ‘addressee’ to 
whom this mere number matters because there is no global government and there is no global civil society. 
According to this view, national inequalities matter because they become the stuﬀ   of political discourse; they 
are used to form political parties or platforms, and to organize interest groups. But at the global level, none 
of that exists because there is no global polity.
Another reason adduced for the irrelevance of global (or for that matter, all) inequality is that only 
changes in absolute income matters to the poor and the rich alike (Krueger, 2002; Feldstein, 1999). In the 
words of Anne Krueger (2002), “Poor people are desperate to improve their material conditions…rather 
than to march up the income distribution [ladder]”. Th   us, even if the absolute income gap between an 
average American and an average African increases, these authors are unconcerned. After all, they argue, the 
average African would be a bit less poor. Th   is, of course, assumes that our income relative to the incomes of 
others does not matter. Yet, this conclusion is at odds with psychological studies that invariably show that 
people do not care only about their absolute income, but also about where they stand in the social pyramid, 
and also whether they think this position to be fair (Graham and Felton, 2005; Frank, 2005).
Or—diﬀ  erently—global inequality may matter. On this side of the issue, there are also diﬀ  erent 
approaches. For Pogge and Reddy (2002) and Singer (2002), global poverty and global inequality are ethical 
issues. Hence, the rich world cannot disown all interest in global poverty and inequality: to some extent, the 
fate of every individual in the world aﬀ  ects us. Distributional justice within a nation, and in the world as a 
whole, is -- from an ethical perspective -- the same thing (see Singer, 2002: Chapter 5).
Th   ere are also more pragmatic reasons why global inequality may matter. Kuznets (1965 [ﬁ  rst pub-
lished in 1954]: 173-174) formulated the following half a century ago: “Since it is only through contact that 
recognition and tension are created, one could argue that the reduction of physical misery associated with 
low income and consumption levels…permit[s] an increase rather than a diminution of political tensions 
[because] the political misery of the poor, the tension created by the observation of the much greater wealth 
of other communities…may have only increased.”
When people observe each other and interact, it is no longer simply a national yardstick that they 
have in mind when they compare their incomes with the incomes of others, but an international or global 
one. What globalization does is to increase awareness of other people’s incomes, and therefore, the percep-
tion (knowledge) of inequalities among both the poor and the rich. If it does so among the poor, then their 
aspirations change: they may no longer be satisﬁ  ed with small increases in their own real income, if they 
know that other people are gaining much more. Th   erefore, the process of globalization by itself changes the 
perception of one’s position, and even if globalization may raise everybody’s real income, it could exacerbate, 
rather than moderate, feelings of despondency and deprivation among the poor.
Globalization, in that sense, is no diﬀ  erent from the process which led to the creation of modern na-
tion states out of isolated, and often mutually estranged, hamlets. National income distribution was similarly 
an abstraction for the people who did not interact with each other, and almost ignored each others’ existence 
and way of life. However, once nation-states came into existence, national inequality became an issue—sim-14  DESA Working Paper No. 26
ply because people were able to compare their own standards of living and to make judgments as to whether 
these income diﬀ  erences were deserved or not. If one believes that the process of globalization would slowly 
lead to the formation of a global polity, then global inequality will indeed become a relevant issue. For it is 
diﬃ   cult to envisage that a fully free exchange of goods, technology and information, transfer of capital, and 
some freedom in the movement of people can go on for a long time without creating a global polity of sorts 
and requiring decision-making processes at the global level.
If so, then we need to develop some rules for global redistribution. Th  e  ﬁ  rst rule, which may be 
called Progressivity 1 rule (a companion to Concept 1 inequality), is that funds should ﬂ  ow from a (mean-
income) rich to a (mean-income) poor country. Th   is requirement is easily satisﬁ  ed. Even today, bilateral aid 
is given by rich to poor countries (not the other way round). But in a globalized world, this is not enough. 
Redistribution needs to be globally progressive—that is, to satisfy the same criteria that we require from 
redistribution within a nation-state. Th   is means that the tax-payer ought to be richer than the beneﬁ  ciary 
of the transfer. But both Progressivity 1 and global Progressivity may be satisﬁ  ed (as shown in Figure 3 by 
points B1 and T1) while the beneﬁ  ciary is a relatively rich individual in a poor country and the tax payer a 
relatively poor individual in a rich country. And it is precisely the perception that many transfers end up in 
the pockets of the rich elite in poor countries which is fuelling the current discontent with multilateral and 
bilateral aid. Th   us, the third requirement ought to be that transfers be such that inequality decreases in both 
donor and recipient countries. Th   is will happen only if the tax payer is relatively rich, even within his/her 
own country, and the beneﬁ  ciary is relatively poor in his/her country. Th   is situation is illustrated by points 
such as T2 and B2.
Now, these three requirements regarding global transfers will be more easily satisﬁ  ed when the in-
come distributions of rich and poor nations do not overlap. Th   is is, for example, the case of France and rural 
Indonesia (illustrated in Figure 1). Even if the distribution of aid money among Indonesian beneﬁ  ciaries is 
random, global progressivity will be satisﬁ  ed since there are practically no people in rural Indonesia who are 
better oﬀ   than even the poorest Frenchmen. But this is not the case if we look at a transfer between France 
and Brazil. Th   ere, assuming that the tax payer belongs to the French middle class (say, around the median of 
Figure 3:
Globally progressive transfer
Income distribution in poor country
B2 B1
Income distribution in rich country
Income
T1 T2
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French income distribution), a purely random allocation of aid to Brazil will still yield a non-negligible prob-
ability of 10 per cent for a globally regressive transfer.34 Th   is means that in the design of global transfers, one 
needs to take into account national income distributions to determine the actual beneﬁ  ciaries of aid. Th  is  is 
likely to give preference to poor and egalitarian countries since transfers to them are unlikely to be globally 
regressive.
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